Capital Flows to Developing Countries: the Allocation Puzzle

capital flows, emerging countries, Feldstein Horioka, neoclassical growth model, Lucas puzzle

Capital Flows to Developing Countries: The Allocation Puzzle

According to the consensus view in growth and development economics, cross country differences in per-capita income largely reflect differences in countries' total factor productivity. We argue that this view has powerful implications for patterns of capital flows: everything else equal, countries with faster productivity growth should invest more, and attract more foreign capital. We then show that the pattern of net capital flows across developing countries is not consistent with this prediction. If anything, capital seems to flow more to countries that invest and grow less. We argue that this result -- which we call the allocation puzzle -- constitutes an important challenge for economic research, and discuss some possible research avenues to solve the puzzle.

The Elusive Gains from International Financial Integration

Standard theoretical arguments tell us that countries with relatively little capital benefit from financial integration as foreign capital flows in and speeds up the process of convergence. We show in a calibrated neoclassical model that conventionally measured welfare gains from this type of convergence appear relatively limited for the typical emerging country. The welfare gain from switching from financial autarky to perfect capital mobility is roughly equivalent to a one percent permanent increase in domestic consumption for the typical emerging economy. This is negligible relative to the potential welfare gain of a take-off in domestic productivity of the magnitude observed in some of these countries.

When bonds matter: home bias in goods and assets

Recent models of international equity portfolios exhibit two potential weaknesses: 1) the structure of equilibrium equity portfolios is determined by the correlation of equity returns with real exchange rates; yet empirically equities don't appear to be a good hedge against real exchange rate risk; 2) Equity portfolios are highly sensitive to preference parameters. This paper solves both problems. It first shows that in more general and realistic environments, the hedging of real exchange rate risks occurs through international bond holdings since relative bond returns are strongly correlated with real exchange rate fluctuations. Equilibrium equity positions are then optimally determined by the correlation of equity returns with the return on non-financial wealth, conditional on the bond returns. The model delivers equilibrium portfolios that are well-behaved as a function of the underlying preference parameters. We find reasonable empirical support for the theory for G-7 countries. We are able to explain short positions in domestic currency bonds for all G-7 countries, as well as significant levels of home equity bias for the US, Japan and Canada.

International financial adjustment

The paper proposes a unified framework to study the dynamics of net foreign assets and exchange rate movements. We show that deteriorations in a country's net exports or net foreign asset position have to be matched either by future net export growth (trade adjustment channel) or by future increases in the returns of the net foreign asset portfolio (hitherto unexplored financial adjustment channel). Using a newly constructed data set on US gross foreign positions, we find that stabilizing valuation effects contribute as much as 31% of the external adjustment. Our theory also has asset pricing implications. Deviations from trend of the ratio of net exports to net foreign assets predict net foreign asset portfolio returns one quarter to two years ahead and net exports at longer horizons. The exchange rate affects the trade balance and the valuation of net foreign assets. It is forecastable in and out of sample at one quarter and beyond. A one standard deviation decrease of the ratio of net exports to net foreign assets predicts an annualized 4% depreciation of the exchange rate over the next quarter.

When Bonds Matter: Home Bias in Goods and Assets

This paper presents a model of international portfolios with real exchange rate and non financial risks that accounts for observed levels of equity home bias. A key feature is that investors can trade equities as well as domestic and foreign real bonds. Bonds matter: in equilibrium, investors structure their bond portfolio to hedge real exchange rate risk since relative bond returns are strongly correlated with real exchange rate movements. Equity home bias does not arise from the co-movements between relative stock returns and real exchange rates, but from the hedging properties of stock returns against other sources of risk, conditionally on bond returns. We estimate the optimal equity and bond portfolios implied by the model for G-7 countries and find strong empirical support for the theory. We are able to account for a significant share of the equity home bias and obtain a currency exposure of bond portfolios comparable to the data.

From World Banker to World Venture Capitalist: US External Adjustment and the Exorbitant Privilege

Does the center country of the International Monetary System enjoy an "exorbitant privilege" that significantly weakens its external constraint as has been asserted in some European quarters? Using a newly constructed dataset, we perform a detailed analysis of the historical evolution of US external assets and liabilities at market value since 1952. We find strong evidence of a sizeable excess return of gross assets over gross liabilities. Interestingly, this excess return increased after the collapse of the BrettonWoods fixed exchange rate system. It is mainly due to a "return discount": within each class of assets, the total return (yields and capital gains) that the US has to pay to foreigners is smaller than the total return the US gets on its foreign assets. We also find evidence of a "composition effect": the US tends to borrow short and lend long. As financial globalization accelerated its pace, the US transformed itself from a World Banker into a World Venture Capitalist, investing greater amounts in high yield assets such as equity and FDI. We use these findings to cast some light on the sustainability of the current global imbalances.